Are Racial Preferences in Dating Morally Defensible by Khawaja, Mohammad Harith Aslam
Are Racial Preferences in Dating Morally Defensible? 35 
“I only date white girls.” “I don’t think black women are
hot.” “I have a fetish for Asian-Americans.” Each of these state-
ments expresses a racial preference for dating partners. Moreover, 
these preferences aren’t merely inclusionary. They are also exclu-
sionary in the sense that people acting upon them will both in-
clude and preclude others as potential spouses because of their 
race. Racial dating preferences have been slowly diversifying: 
statistics show over fifteen percent of newly-wed couples in the 
US are interracial, a three-fold increase to the number 50 years 
ago.1 Nonetheless, interracial couples comprise only a tenth of all 
American couples, and white people continue to remain the least 
likely to marry people of color, demonstrating stronger intra-race 
mating than all other races.2  
The morality of race-based dating preferences is thus a 
sensitive, but important issue, partly because it exposes our inter-
nalized racially colored desires and partly because it is charged 
with correcting them. In this paper, I inspect what makes certain 
preferences racist, and others less morally problematic, but still 
indefensible. I build on a valuable framework of race-based fa-
voritism proposed by J.L. Garcia, and extend it to racial dating 
practices, finding that it fails to capture what is morally problem-
atic in a suspicious case of racial preference. I then build on Gar-
cia’s baseline framework to create a new structure of moral re-
quirements. My modified framework proposes that exclusionary 
racial preferences in dating are not morally defensible because 
they deny people of other races a ‘fair chance’ to be potential 
partners. Consequently, I consider objections to and the implica-
tions of my theory, concluding with a discussion of the societal 
shaping of our sexual, among other, desires.   
In The Heart of Racism, Jorge Garcia proposes what he 
calls a “volitional conception of racism.”3 According to him, atti-
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tudes and comportments, rather than beliefs or cognitive theories, 
make people racist. But what constitutes a racist attitude? Garcia 
thinks “one is a racist when one either does not care at all or does 
not care enough (i.e., as much as morality requires) or does not 
care in the right ways about people assigned to a certain racial 
group, where this disregard is based on racial classification.”4 The 
volitional account of racism is then fundamentally concerned with 
what we morally owe others because of their humanity. Violating, 
or falling short of these minimal moral duties because of 
someone’s race is what constitutes racism: “Racism, thus, will 
often offend against justice…because one sort of injury to another 
is withholding from her the respect she is owed.”5
Garcia applies this framework to show how race-based 
favoritism may be justified. He argues that “Preferential treat-
ment, while race-based, is not normally based on any racial disre-
gard” toward people of other races.6 We may “licitly choose to 
bestow favors instead on those to whom we feel more warmly…I 
may give A more than A has a claim to get from me and more 
than I give B, while nevertheless giving B everything to which 
she is entitled (and even more).”7 Thus, “…discriminating in fa-
vor of R1s [Race 1s]  need not entail discriminating against R2s 
[Race 2s].”8 So, according to Garcia, race-based preference are 
morally acceptable as long as they do not deny what must be ac-
corded to those of other races. Here is a reconstruction of the ar-
gument:  
Premise 1: We have a duty to give to people of all races at 
least what they are morally owed. This is the baseline moral 
requirement.  
Premise 2: Falling shor t of this threshold constitutes mor-
al shortcoming and is reprehensible.  
Premise 3: Giving people more than they are morally 
owed because of their race is morally acceptable.  
Conclusion: We can give cer tain people more than they 
are morally owed because of their race, provided that in doing 
so, we do not fall short of our minimum moral duties towards 
people of other races.  
Racial preferences in dating, being a kind of favoritism, 
lie within the domain of Garcia’s argument. By dating, I mean 
established relationships. I am not concerned with short-term sex-
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ual relations, one-night stands, hook-ups or the like. Instead, for 
the purposes of my argument, I will consider sentimental, long-
term partnerships, even if some of my claims hold for other sexu-
al arrangements. Extending Garcia’s framework for race-based 
favoritism to racial dating permits us to extrapolate the conditions 
under which race-based dating preferences would be morally ac-
ceptable: it is defensible to only date people of a certain race pro-
vided one does not violate moral duties toward people of other 
races. Since no one is owed sex or relationships, nor does one 
owe others sex or relationships, no moral duties are violated in a 
dating scheme that filters potential partners by race. To proceed, I 
will pose two common and intuitively problematic cases of racial 
dating. Each will subsequently be charitably analyzed per Garci-
a’s framework, and the results of the analysis will provide insight 
into the correctness of the system. The purpose of this project is 
to test the sturdiness of Garcia’s framework; a false negative in 
either case will indicate a flaw somewhere in the system.  
The first case is as follows. John, a resident of an all-white 
fraternity in Kentucky, cracks open a can of beer and exclaims to 
his friends about a girl who asked him out last week: “I won’t 
date her because she’s black.” John’s proclamation affirms there 
is something about blackness that is unworthy, i.e. there is some 
improper, even disparaging characteristic tied to being black that 
makes his potential partner unsuitable in his eyes. Per Garcia’s 
framework, John is a racist. Why? Because he denigrates his ad-
mirer on account of her race, violating the minimum duty of re-
spect owed to black women, on the grounds that she is black. I 
agree with Garcia; I think most people would consider John a rac-
ist and Garcia’s account accurately explains why he is intuitively 
and normatively so. Garcia’s framework thus passes the first test.  
The second, and more interesting case is the following: 
Jack, a white male North-East college athlete gestures at a black 
classmate in the cafeteria, leans across the table and quietly dis-
closes to his white friends who are engaged in a discussion about 
women: “I’m not a racist, but I wouldn’t date her because I’m just 
not attracted to black women. I wouldn’t consider dating a black 
woman because I just don’t find them pretty. It’s just like Aziz, 
who only dates white girls. I don’t like dark skin, or braids or 
broad lips, just like he doesn’t find yellow skin attractive. I don’t 
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think there’s anything wrong with black women though.” 
There is a reason this case makes us feel uncomfortable. 
Most people would agree there is something intuitively problem-
atic about it, but what makes this latter case problematic is not as 
obvious as in the former. While John is quite obviously insulting 
a black woman because of her race, the same cannot be said of 
Jack, who is making a more nuanced statement of his sexual pref-
erences. No person or race has a right to sex or partnerships, so 
the fact that Jack does not engage in relationships with black 
women could seem justified. Indeed, Garcia’s framework does 
conclude that Jack’s remark is morally defensible: not dating 
black women because of their race would not violate any duties 
owed to them; since no one is owed a relationship, rejecting peo-
ple on the basis of their race – like Jack’s rejection of the black 
woman – is morally defensible. This is a surprising conclusion 
and does not accord with the intuitions of many. Excluding peo-
ple on the basis of their race as potential partners seems morally 
problematic, even when seemingly nuanced explanations like 
Jack’s are offered. Moreover, even if Garcia’s framework is to be 
conceived of as not just a descriptive but a prescriptive account of 
race-based preferences, the second case seems morally suspicious 
in a way Garcia’s framework cannot capture. Excluding people as 
potential partners because of their race violates some kind of mor-
al requisite that Garcia’s framework does not encompass. Jack, 
our second white male, is thus a false negative. 
Despite its false negative, I think there is a way to repair 
Garcia’s framework. The repair work consists in building upon it, 
and my subsequent modified moral structure diagnoses and ex-
plains Jack’s moral shortcoming. In my analysis, the defect in 
Garcia’s argument lies at Premise 1. To remind readers, Premise 
1 states: “We have a duty to give to people of all races at least 
what they are morally owed. This is the baseline moral require-
ment.” I contend we should give to others more than what our 
minimum moral duties toward them entail. In dating, this is espe-
cially important. Here is how I rectify the framework: I keep Gar-
cia’s conception of a moral baseline because it is helpful in cap-
turing what is racist in John’s case. Moreover, it explains the ca-
nonical case of racist dating today, in the US and across the 
world. Then, I add a supplementary moral stipulation to Garcia’s 
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framework. By supplementary stipulation, I mean a moral requi-
site that is less stringent than an overriding duty, in the sense that 
falling short of this supplementary moral stipulation implies a 
lesser opprobrium than falling short of Garcia’s original baseline 
moral duties. The nature of the additional requirement is to give 
people of all races what I call a ‘fair chance’ to be a potential 
partner. To give others a fair chance to be a potential partner 
means to not simply discard their possibility as a future partner 
because of their race but to allow them the opportunity to appeal 
to oneself, even if one doesn’t end up dating them. Practically, a 
fair chance would look like interacting with people of all races 
and getting to know them at deeper levels, engaging with them 
and being willing to learn their perspectives, putting oneself in 
the physical and mental spaces where they could appeal to one-
self, and going out to drinks, coffee and even first dates with 
them. Truly giving others a fair chance does not instrumentalize 
them; it treats them as potential partners, with the genuine possi-
bility of a future relationship – as ends in themselves and not as 
means to some other end.  
According to the supplemented framework, our second 
white male, Jack, is morally reprehensible because he rejects 
black women without giving them a fair chance. He is unprepared 
to go on dates, chat, interact, get to know them on deeper levels, 
unwilling to learn their perspectives or even allow them the space 
and the occasion to appeal to him and be a potential partner. The 
violation of the ‘fair chance’ principle, then, is what makes his 
case morally problematic. As Jack’s case shows, the fair chance 
stipulation does both descriptive and normative work; it explains 
why the case is intuitively wrong and proposes how we should act 
instead. Garcia’s basic framework enhanced with the ‘fair chance’ 
stipulation hence tests correctly against edge cases of race-based 
dating preferences.  
An attentive reader may object. She may ask why the ‘fair 
chance’ stipulation isn’t simply part of Garcia’s original baseline 
duties, but some additional requirement built on top of the frame-
work. In other words, why is giving a fair chance to people of all 
races not a moral duty we owe them but some not-as-important 
stipulation? This objection is best answered in light of our afore-
detailed cases. Had we included the ‘fair chance’ principle as a 
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minimum moral duty, we would be inclined to conclude Jack, our 
second white male is racist, a conclusion that I think is inaccurate. 
Falling short of the moral baseline because of someone’s race 
makes the offender a racist, as exemplified by John, our first 
white male. Falling short of the supplementary ‘fair chance’ stip-
ulation, provided one has respected all basic moral duties, makes 
one morally reprehensible, but not a racist. It is this latter kind of 
moral violation, and not the former, for which our second white 
male, Jack, must be indicted. Labelling Jack a racist misses the 
subtle difference between the two cases; Jack commits a racial 
infringement, but not a racist one; he is being disrespectful of 
black people, but in a different, and less morally harmful way 
than racist John is. It would thus be a mistake to attach the same 
level of moral opprobrium to him by assigning a duty, and not 
just an additional stipulation of a ‘fair chance.’  
The distinction between a racial infringement and a racist 
one has been explored by Lawrence Blum.9 According to Blum, 
one can commit a racial infringement without meriting the label 
of ‘racist.’ Consider the case of an individual who, unbeknownst 
the implications, makes an offensive joke just to go along with a 
group of friends. As long as the said individual does not truly be-
lieve in inferiorizing and loathing the targeted racial group – in 
other words, as long as her intentions are not genuinely antipathic 
– it would be wrong to associate the morally loaded term, ‘racist,’
to such a person. The indicting term, ‘racist,’ should only be re-
served for those who quite explicitly feel a certain way (recall
John, the individual in the first case), whereas those who commit
racial infringements as Jack’s deserve some other appellation;
racially insensitive, perhaps.
Our now piqued objector points out another difficulty. She 
remarks that giving people of all races a fair chance won’t neces-
sarily change our deep-seated race-based dating preferences. It 
will only create an artificial, forced display of racial inclusivity, 
while our original exclusionary racial preferences remain intact 
and unchanged, albeit less conspicuous than before. Moreover, 
not only may giving others a fair chance leave our preferences 
unchanged, but white males like Jack may also act like they are 
giving a fair chance to black people by going out on dates with 
them, yet continue harboring anti-black dating preferences clan-
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destinely; they may drink coffee or chai tea with them, but they 
are never actually going to date them. What to make of these cas-
es?  
To begin, we would say that white males who give a fair 
chance only for show and are unprepared to honestly accept the 
possibility of an inter-racial relationship aren’t really giving a fair 
chance. Giving a fair chance means genuinely entertaining the 
possibility of a future relationship with whomsoever one goes on 
a date with regardless of her race, even if one doesn’t end up da-
ting her. Putting this in context, truly giving a fair chance would 
entail interacting with and thinking about people of all races iden-
tically to members of the favored race for a race-based preferen-
tial dater. Epistemic difficulties notwithstanding, Jack may not 
end up with the black woman, but insofar as he treats her sincere-
ly like a potential partner, he gives her a fair chance. It may also 
help to clarify that I am not advocating a requirement to date peo-
ple of multiple races. I am only advocating a stipulation to con-
sider everyone equally, leaving aside their race. If, for some other 
reason like socio-economic differences, clashing political sensi-
bilities or geographical distances, Jack later decides to not date 
the black woman, he would not be violating the ‘fair chance’ 
principle.  
But what about the counterargument that giving a fair 
chance to everyone doesn’t necessarily decolorize our dating 
preferences? I contend that our desires, and our dating prefer-
ences, are shaped by the kinds of people we choose to interact 
with and the kinds of spaces we inhabit. Exposure to different 
perspectives, interactions with individuals of different races and 
participating in situations where one is likely to learn about dif-
ferent cultural and racial backgrounds are certain to affect our ra-
cial predilections in dating. That the choices we make affect our 
future preferences is an accepted psychological fact; thus, giving 
a fair chance is very likely to dismantle deep-seated racial prefer-
ences in dating, contributing to a diverse outlook in the dating 
world.10  
This brings us to an important juncture in our discussion. 
In today’s society, many of our deep-rooted racial preferences for 
partners are ingrained and reinforced by the ubiquitous manifesta-
tions of patriarchal ideology “in advertising, articles in the media, 
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in so-called success stories, [and] in Miss America pageants.”11 12 
Our systems of mass communication are dominated by messages 
demanding women to conform to a narrow image based around 
the slim, “hot blond” in order to be attractive.13 The slim hot-
blond, one of only a few feminine “beauty imperative[s]”, “sets a 
new norm: those who refuse to submit to it will become stigma-
tised.”14 While men are allowed more flexible standards for an 
attractive body – the ‘dad’ bod, old men, geeks, nerds and effete 
men –, racial beauty standards amongst males, too, have emerged 
with white males at the top of the hierarchy. Such standards fash-
ion the sexual desires of citizens of the modern society force-fed 
with these beauty paradigms; people of all genders internalize and 
then act upon warped beauty preferences to make dating deci-
sions. This is what Amia Srinivasan calls the “political shaping of 
our desires.”15 Online dating studies have showed that Asian 
males and black females are the most racially excluded of all par-
ticipants.16 These exclusions are indicative of assimilated racial 
beauty standards that inform dating preferences. Since many of 
our race-based dating preferences stem from unjust standards, it is 
a responsibility to undertake an active reshaping of our desires to 
create a more inclusive society. This is why giving a fair chance 
to people of all races is a moral stipulation – interacting deeply 
with diverse communities helps reform our desires and combat 
unfair racial prioritization to create a truly racially integrated soci-
ety. Given a society historically fractured along racial fault lines 
and the pivotal role social discourse plays in shaping our prefer-
ences, offering people of all races a fair chance to become a po-
tential partner is essential to redress racial inequity.17  
One implication of my framework is that a fair chance 
must be offered by peoples of all races to peoples of all races. In 
other words, the ‘fair chance’ principle does not take into account 
historical race relations or power dynamics, racial oppression or 
stigmatization, prescribing instead an equal moral requirement to 
all races. This may be objectionable because some same-race da-
ting preferences are a show of solidarity within races that have 
been and continue to be discriminated against, like black people 
in America. Some would even say that moral obligations are 
asymmetric, and the onus should be on the dominating race, i.e. 
white people, to rectify the unjust beauty standards they have al-
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most singe-handedly created. The ‘fair chance’ principle thus 
misses something important when it prescribes the same moral 
stipulation for everyone.  
I respectfully disagree. I believe people of all races, and 
not just white people, have a moral responsibility to question, re-
consider and re-cultivate their desires. Unjust racial beauty stand-
ards are internalized by everyone, so it is logical that everyone 
partake in rectifying their nefarious effects, something effected by 
giving everyone a ‘fair chance’ as a dating partner. Moreover, 
giving a fair chance to everyone demonstrates a commitment to a 
truly racially integrated society. Black-black intra-race dating 
may be a display of solidarity, but to achieve a society socially 
unified along racial lines, one absolved of racial separation and 
stigmatization, we should entertain the possibility and even the 
reality of interracial relationships. Solidarity may, of course, still 
be shown alternatively by participating in black rights move-
ments, campaigning for increased black political membership and 
demonstrating against prejudiced laws that have persisted to this 
day, for example. That everyone and not simply people who have 
historically been in power are required to give a fair chance is 
then an implication I am willing to accept.  
To recapitulate, offering people of all races a ‘fair chance’ 
to become a potential partner is a moral stipulation we violate 
when we exclude certain peoples as potential dating partners be-
cause of their race. In doing so, though not racist, we are still 
morally blameworthy. Fulfilling the ‘fair chance’ requisite is nec-
essary to overcome internalized racially prejudiced dating prefer-
ences, and to create a racially integrated and inclusive society. 
Acting upon it is thus essential to create a more equitable world.  
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